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Indirect reciprocity is one of the main mechanisms to explain the emergence and sustainment of
altruism in societies. The standard approach to indirect reciprocity are reputation models. These are
games in which players base their decisions on their opponent’s reputation gained in past interactions
with other players (moral assessment). The combination of actions and moral assessment leads to a
large diversity of strategies, thus determining the stability of any of them against invasions by all the
others is a difficult task. We use a variant of a previously introduced reputation-based model that let
us systematically analyze all these invasions and determine which ones are successful. Accordingly we
are able to identify the third-order strategies (those which, apart from the action, judge considering
both the reputation of the donor and that of the recipient) that are evolutionarily stable. Our results
reveal that if a strategy resists the invasion of any other one sharing its same moral assessment, it
can resist the invasion of any other strategy. However, if actions are not always witnessed, cheaters
(i.e., individuals with a probability of defecting regardless of the opponent’s reputation) have a
chance to defeat the stable strategies for some choices of the probabilities of cheating and of being
witnessed. Remarkably, by analyzing this issue with adaptive dynamics we find that whether a
honest population resists the invasion of cheaters is determined by a Hamilton-like rule—with the
probability that the cheat is discovered playing the role of the relatedness parameter.
PACS numbers: 02.50.-r,87.10.-e,87.23.-n,89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Human being is the social animal par excellence. An
individual can help another even if it is the first time they
meet or if they know that they will never meet again.
Several mechanisms have been proposed to explain co-
operation between unrelated individuals. Among them
reciprocity, either direct or indirect, stands as one of the
most successful explanations of altruism [1]. In direct
reciprocity individuals pay back the help received in re-
peated encounters with the same partner (“I help you if
you help me”) [2]. In society, however, many interactions
have low chances to be repeated with the same individual.
To explain altruism in those interactions, the concept of
indirect reciprocity was introduced [3, 4]. Through this
mechanism, individuals do not receive the consequences
of their actions directly from the individuals they inter-
act with, but indirectly through society (“I help others
to be helped by others”). Indirect reciprocity is an im-
portant mechanism for the emergence and sustainment
of altruism not only in small-scale human societies [5–9]
but in other species as well [10]. And it certainly plays
an important role in communication networks [11, 12].
There are two types of indirect reciprocity: upstream
and downstream. In upstream reciprocity [13, 14] an in-
dividual opts for a given action taking into account if
she was previously helped or not. In this respect up-
stream reciprocity is more akin to a learning mechanism,
because individuals adapt their choices based on their
past experience. In downstream reciprocity—also called
reputation-based indirect reciprocity—an individual as-
signs a reputation to the others taking into account how
they interact with the rest of the society [6, 15–18]. These
reputations allow her to decide whether she should help
these individuals or not in potential future encounters
with them. Accordingly, downstream indirect reciprocity
is a cognitively very demanding task: it requires observa-
tion, memory and communication. It is this reputation-
based indirect reciprocity that will be the focus of the
present work.
Two different kinds of models of reputation-based indi-
rect reciprocity have been considered in the literature. In
indirect observation models [16] each action is observed
and judged only by one individual, who spreads this in-
formation across the population through verbal commu-
nication and gossip. Therefore all individuals share the
same opinion about each other. On the contrary, in di-
rect observation models [17, 19, 20] everyone witnesses
the action and makes her private judgment of it. Thus
individuals’ different opinions about the rest of the mem-
bers of the society can coexist in this kind of models.
Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16] and Brandt and Sigmund [17]
have proposed a classification of the different strategies
in games with indirect reciprocity through their assess-
ment and action modules. Strategies can be classified ei-
ther as second order or as third order strategies. In both
cases, the reputation is assigned taking into account the
observed action and the reputation of the individual who
received it. But third-order strategies also look at the rep-
utation of the individual who performs the action. The
dynamics of second-order assessments has been explored
in [21]. Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16] also studied systemati-
cally the evolutionarily stability of third order strategies.
Their model is an indirect observation model and there-
fore the whole society shares the same moral assessment.
Stability is studied by confronting strategies with differ-
ent action rules. They concluded that there are eight
strategies—the so-called leading eight—which are evolu-
tionary stable strategies (ESS) under these assumptions.
The meaning and success of these strategies has also been
studied by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [22]. On the other hand,
Uchida and Sigmund [23] have chosen some of the leading
eight strategies that share the same action rules but have
different moral assessment and have confronted them in
2a model with private opinions.
In this work, we extend the systematic study carried
out by Ohtsuki and Iwasa confronting strategies with dif-
ferent moral assessments. Unlike their work, we use a
direct observation model in which individuals no longer
share the same opinion about the rest of the population.
We introduce the concept of coherence as a measure of
the relation between the moral assessment and the action
rules of a strategy and study how it relates to the stabil-
ity and efficiency of the strategies. We identify which
strategies resist the invasion of all the other strategies,
i.e., which combinations of moral assessment and action
rules emerge under this evolutionary competition. Fi-
nally we explore the effect that an action is witnessed
by nobody in the population. Individuals can then face
the risk to cheat—i.e., defect regardless of the opponent’s
reputation—at no own reputation cost.
The present paper is structured as follows. In section II
we introduce the model. In section III we describe its
mathematical implementation. We study homogeneous
populations and discuss their stability against invasions
by other strategies. We also analyze the effect on in-
troducing a probability of cheating, when actions have a
chance not to be witnessed. Finally, our results are shown
in section IV and discussed in section V.
II. MODEL
Brandt and Sigmund [17] introduced a very stylized
model of indirect reciprocity based on reputation, and
Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16, 22] investigated the stability of
its strategies under the assumption that all individuals
share the same moral judgment.
The model we will be dealing with in this work is a
slight modification of this basic model. It consists of an
infinite, well-mixed population, of interacting and judg-
ing individuals. Every time step a pair of individuals are
randomly and equiprobably drawn from the population.
One of them plays the role of the donor and the other one
of the recipient. The donor then decides whether to pay
a cost c > 0 to help (C) the recipient or not (D). If the re-
cipient is helped, she receives a benefit b > c. This action
is observed by every individual of the population (includ-
ing themselves). Observers privately judge the donor for
the action taken on the recipient according to their own
moral assessment, and assign her a reputation—either
good (G) or bad (B)—accordingly. Therefore every in-
dividual in the population has a private opinion of every
other individual, including herself.
This process is repeated until the population reaches
an equilibrium (we will define this equilibrium in more
precise terms in the next section). Then the average pay-
off that every individual receives in this repeated game is
computed. Direct reciprocity is excluded from this game
because the population is virtually infinite—hence the
probability that two people meet again is negligible.
We consider third order indirect reciprocity, i.e., each
strategy is described by two moduli: the action rules and
the moral assessments.
The action rules determine what the donor must do
(either help or refuse to help) given the reputation of
both players. Specifically, aiαβ = 1 (C) if strategist i with
reputation α helps an individual with reputation β (both
according to i’s moral judgments) and 0 (D) otherwise.
The moral assessments tell the individual if the action
just witnessed should be judged as good or bad, hence
revising the donor’s reputation. Specifically, miαβ(a) =
1 (G) if strategist i assigns good reputation to a donor
previously judged α by i, who performs an action a on an
recipient previously judged β by i, and is 0 (B) otherwise.
Thus each strategy is defined by 12 numbers: 4 for
the action module and 8 for the moral module. This
amounts to 4096 different possible strategies. Although
a thorough study of mutual invasions and coexistence of
different strategies —as that performed in Ref. [24] for a
direct reciprocity model— would be desirable, the wealth
of strategies forbids it, and we should content ourselves
with a pairwise test of mutual invadability.
We will assume that sometimes players do not act ac-
cording to their action rules [16, 19, 25–27]. Thus, with
a probability ǫA a donor defects regardless of her action
rules and with 1−ǫA she performs the action she planned
to. Another source of errors is misjudgment, i.e., and in-
dividual can make a mistake in interpreting the action.
In this category lies social pressure. This is a kind of er-
ror that is especially important if the information on the
action performed is spread by gossiping, because then, a
misjudgment of the witness will lead to a misjudgment of
the entire population. Otherwise, it affects only a small
fraction of the individuals. Since keeping track of errors
may lead to a proliferation of judgments—even between
individuals sharing the same moral assessment—and ren-
der the model computationally unfeasible, we will content
ourselves by implementing only errors in the action.
III. MATHEMATICAL IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE MODEL
A. Homogeneous populations
Let us start by assuming that there is only one strat-
egy i present in the population. Let xi be the fraction
of individuals considered good by the whole population
(there is a unique moral assessment). Then the rate of
change of xi is given by
dxi
dt
=
∑
αβ
χα(xi)χβ(xi)Pi,αβ − xi, (1)
where Pi,αβ is the probability that a donor of reputation
α acting on a recipient with reputation β is considered
good by the population. This probability can be obtained
as
Pi,αβ = (1 − ǫA)miαβ(aiαβ) + ǫAmiαβ(D) (2)
because with probability ǫA no help is provided and with
probability 1 − ǫA the action performed is aiαβ , as pre-
scribed by the action module. We have also introduced
the auxiliary function χγ(xi),
χγ(xi) = γxi + (1− γ)(1 − xi), (3)
which in this case represents the fraction of individuals
with reputation γ.
The dynamics reaches an equilibrium when xi =∑
αβ χα(xi)χβ(xi)Pi,αβ . Therefore the fraction of good
3individuals in a homogeneous population in equilibrium
is the solution 0 6 xi 6 1 of the quadratic equation
F (xi) = 0, where
F (xi) =x
2
i (Pi,11 + Pi,00 − Pi,10 − Pi,01)
+ xi(Pi,10 + Pi,01 − 2Pi,00 − 1) + Pi,00.
(4)
As F (0) = Pi,00 > 0 and F (1) = Pi,11 − 1 6 0, there is
always a solution in [0, 1], but in some cases there may be
two (when Pi,00 = 0 or Pi,11 = 1 or both), one stable and
one unstable, and there is a degenerate case (when all
coefficients in F (xi) vanish) in which any xi is a solution.
In this latter case, adding a small error, ǫm, in the moral
assessment determines uniquely a stable solution. When
the population is homogeneous this can be done at no
computational cost by simply replacing Pi,αβ in Eq. (4)
by (1−2ǫm)Pi,αβ+ǫm. This yields the expression F (xi) =
ǫm(1 − 2xi), whose only root is xi = 1/2, regardless of
ǫm. Hence we take this solution—which holds even in the
limit ǫm → 0—as the solution of this degenerate case.
Given the equilibrium fraction xiH , the probability
that an individual helps another is
θiH = (1 − ǫa)
∑
αβ
χα(xiH)χβ(xiH)aiαβ . (5)
Therefore the average payoff that any individual in this
population obtains is
WiH = (b − c)θiH . (6)
As the whole population shares the same strategy, it can
be regarded a measure of ‘self-efficiency’. This provides
a mean to classify strategies.
Coherence provides an alternative classification crite-
rion. Given an action a that a donor with reputation α
performs on a recipient with reputation β, we call an indi-
vidual coherent if placed on the donor’s feet she performs
the same action a when she morally assesses it as good,
and the opposite action 1 − a when she morally assesses
it as bad. In other words, an individual is coherent if
she performs actions that she judges as good and do the
opposite of actions that she judges as bad. Thus we can
introduce a coherency index h as
hi =
1
2
∑
αβ a
[
1−|miαβ(a)− δ(a, aiαβ)|
]
χα (xiH)χβ (xiH) ,
(7)
where δ(x, y) = 1 if x = y and 0 otherwise. This index
can range from 0 (no coherence) to 1 (full coherence).
Notice that the coherence of a strategy can change when
more strategies are present in the population, because
it depends on the fraction of good and bad individuals.
Nevertheless, for the sake of classification, we have de-
fined this index for a homogeneous population so that it
is uniquely determined by xiH , and therefore is an intrin-
sic feature of each strategy.
B. Stability of strategies
Consider now a homogeneous population where indi-
viduals share the same resident strategy. From time to
time a small fraction of the population can adopt a new
mutant strategy. This mutant strategy will eventually
invade the resident population if mutants obtain a higher
payoff than residents.
Calculating these payoffs requires to compute the four
fractions of individuals that are considered good and bad
by the first and the second strategy in equilibrium. In
the limit where the fraction of mutants is very small both
residents and mutants interact only with residents. The
dynamics of these four fractions of individuals is given in
this limit by the equations
dxΛ1Λ21
dt
=
∑
α1α2
β1β2
xα1α21 x
β1β2
1 P
Λ1Λ2
1,α1β1,α2β2
− xΛ1Λ21 , (8)
dxΛ1Λ22
dt
=
∑
α1α2
β1β2
xα1α22 x
β1β2
1 P
Λ1Λ2
2,α1β1,α2β2
− xΛ1Λ22 , (9)
where xΛ1Λ2i are the fractions of i-strategists (i = 1 for
residents and i = 2 for mutants) who are judged Λ1 by
residents and Λ2 by mutants; P
Λ1Λ2
i,α1β1,α2β2
is the probabil-
ity that an i-strategist with reputation α1 for residents
and α2 for mutants, acting on a recipient of the resident
population with reputation β1 for other residents and β2
for mutants, is judged Λ1 by residents and Λ2 by mutants.
The form of this probability is
PΛ1Λ2i,α1β1,α2β2 =(1− ǫA)δ
(
Λ1,m1α1β1(aiαiβi)
)
× δ
(
Λ2,m2α2β2(aiαiβi)
)
+ ǫAδ
(
Λ1,m1α1β1(D)
)
× δ
(
Λ2,m2α2β2(D)
)
.
(10)
Equations (8) and (9) can be simplified in the equi-
librium. Nonetheless some of the equations need to
be numerically solved (see Appendix A). To this pur-
pose we must start from a sensible initial condition.
We will assume that just before the invasion begins,
all individuals—both mutants and resident—share the
same opinion about everybody. The rationale for this
choice is that, before the change of strategy undergone
by mutants takes place, the population was homoge-
neous. Therefore xGGi (0) = xiH , x
BB
i (0) = 1 − xiH and
xGBi (0) = x
BG
i (0) = 0.
Once the fractions in equilibrium xΛ1Λ2i are known, the
probabilities θi,j that an i-strategist helps a j-strategist
(i, j = 1, 2) are obtained as
θ1,j = (1− ǫA)
∑
αβ
χα(x
G∗
1 )χβ(x
G∗
j ) a1αβ ,
θ2,j = (1− ǫA)
∑
αβ
χα(x
∗G
2 )χβ(x
∗G
j ) a2αβ ,
(11)
where we have introduced the short-hand notation xG∗i =∑
Λ2
xGΛ2i and x
∗G
i =
∑
Λ1
xΛ1Gi to denote the sum over
a given reputation. Obviously, xG∗i (x
∗G
i ) is the fraction
of i-strategists that are judged as good by the resident
(mutant) players irrespective of the mutant’s (resident’s)
judgement.
Finally, the average payoff W (i|j) that an i-strategist
receives from a j-strategist can be computed as
W (i|j) =
{
(b − c) θi,i, i = j,
b θj,i − c θi,j , i 6= j.
(12)
4The resident population cannot be invaded by the mu-
tants if W (1|1) > W (2|1) or if W (1|1) = W (2|1) and
W (1|2) > W (2|2). If the resident strategy resists the in-
vasions of all the other mutant strategies it is considered
evolutionarily stable.
IV. RESULTS
A. Stability of strategies
Our aim is to identify strategies that are evolutionarily
stable. In principle this requires for every strategy to
check whether it can be invaded by every other strategy.
However the number of pairs of strategies is larger than
1.5×107, so this becomes too demanding a computational
task. Accordingly we proceed in two steps: (i) we look
for all strategies that are stable against invasions by other
strategies sharing the same moral assessment; and (ii) we
study the stability of these selected strategies against all
the remaining ones.
Our Eqs. (8) and (9) reduce to those used in Ref. [16]
if we fix the moral assessments and neglect moral errors.
We carried out our analysis for different values of the
action error ǫA (0.1, 0.01 and 0.001) and benefit-to-cost
b/c ratio (1.2, 1.5, 2 and 3).
In Fig. 1 we represent the strategies that are stable
against invasions by all strategies sharing the same moral
assessment, as a function of their normalized average pay-
off W˜H = WH [(b − c)(1 − ǫA)]
−1 and their coherence.
These strategies always appear in pairs since there is a
symmetry in the reputation: if labels “good” and “bad”
are exchanged the results are not affected (see [16] for
more details). Notice though that there is symmetry only
in the moral assessment but not in the action. The reason
is that cooperating and defecting are not just labels be-
cause they have consequences in the payoffs obtained. It
is easy to show, using Eq. (7) that the sum of the coher-
ences of a strategy and its “mirror” strategy is always 1.
Coherence thus provides an external assessment on moral
labels, breaking the symmetry and permitting to differ-
entiate between a strategy and its mirror. In Fig. 1 we
only show the results for the coherent strategy (h > 0.5)
of the pair and report how many pairs Np are shown.
Figure 1 shows that the larger the benefit-to-cost ra-
tio, the higher the number of stable strategies; in other
words, it is difficult to break into a population whose indi-
viduals obtain high rewards for help. Moreover, we have
counted the number of pairs of strategies in which each
strategy can be invaded by the other—i.e., at least one
mixed equilibrium is formed. The number of these pairs
also appears to be larger the higher the benefit-to-cost
ratio (2500–2600 pairs for b/c = 3 vs. 1500–1700 for the
remaining cases). Therefore even if a mutant invades a
resident strategy, it is less likely that it eventually dom-
inates the population if b/c is high. From Fig. 1 we also
conclude that a high ǫA allows invaders to spread easier
in the resident population.
On the other hand, payoff and coherence seem to be
correlated. Specifically, stable strategies with high pay-
off are highly coherent (incoherent for the their mirror
strategies). In Table I we list all coherent stable strate-
gies along with their payoffs for b/c = 2 and ǫA = 0.01.
Most of them coincide with those found by [16]. There
are some minor differences though because we are using
slightly different models. The eight strategies with the
highest payoff correspond to the so-called Leading Eight
[16]. These strategies are present in all cases shown in
Fig. 1. All stable strategies have some common features:
(i) not helping good individuals is always considered bad,
(ii) good individuals never help bad ones, (iii) good indi-
viduals always help good individuals—except when errors
occur—and that is judged as good. (There are two strate-
gies for which the last feature is quite the opposite, but
they receive rather low payoffs.)
Notice that the absence of errors in the moral assess-
ments renders all defective strategies (strategies that al-
ways defect) vulnerable to invasions. Ohtsuki and Iwasa
[16] found that all defective strategies were stable; the
reason is that although these strategies never reward, er-
rors in judgments provide them some payoff. This does
not happen in the present model. Thus defective strate-
gies are no longer stable.
Once identified the strategies that cannot be invaded
by others with the same moral assessments, we study
which of them are actually stable against the invasion
by any other strategy. We have found that all those
strategies remain stable even if strategies with different
moral assessments try to invade them. Besides, we have
also checked that strategies that can be invaded by other
strategies with the same moral assessment can be in-
vaded by some strategies with different moral assessment
as well.
B. Robustness against initial misjudgments
We have checked sensitivity of these results with re-
spect to a different choice of the initial conditions to solve
Eqs. (8) and (9). In Sec. III B we made the assumption
that, before a mutation occurs, all individuals share the
same opinion about everybody because the population is
homogeneous. Initial misjudgments can lead a fraction
of the population to disagree from the general opinion.
This choice for initial conditions may be modeled as
xGGi (0) = (1− ǫ
B
r )xiH ,
xGBi (0) = ǫ
B
r xiH ,
xBBi (0) = (1 − ǫ
G
r )(1 − xiH),
xBGi (0) = ǫ
G
r (1− xiH),
(13)
where ǫBr (ǫ
G
r ) is the fraction of individuals that are
misjudged as bad (good) by the mutants. Note that if
ǫBr = ǫ
G
r = 0 the whole population agrees in its judg-
ments and we recover the former initial conditions.
Depending on the (small) values of ǫBr and ǫ
G
r , we
have checked that the initial conditions (13) may lead
to three different scenarios. In the first one xGGi = xiH ,
xBBi = 1 − xiH and x
GB
i = x
BG
i = 0, so that misjudg-
ments fade away and we recover a homogeneous popula-
tion. In the second scenario initial misjudgments remain
or even grow (xGGi and x
BB
i decrease and x
GB
i and x
BG
i
increase), but the payoff obtained by the mutants is lower
than that obtained by the residents. Consequently the
mutants are expelled and a homogeneous population is
restored. In the third scenario initial misjudgments also
remain and the mutants obtain higher payoffs than the
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Representation of the normalized average payoff W˜H as a function of the coherence h for the stables
strategies. Only the coherent strategy (h > 0.5) of each pair is represented. Different panels show results for different ǫA and
b/c.
residents, so that misjudgments eventually spread. We
have found that around 850 strategies lie in this last case
(considering differences between mutant’s and resident’s
payoffs higher than 10−6) when b/c = 2 and ǫA = 0.01.
Fortunately none of these strategies belong to the group
of the stable ones, so this misjudgment spreading does
not affect the evolutionary fate of the population.
C. Stability in the presence of cheating
Consider now the situation in which actions are not
always witnessed; instead, there is a chance that they
pass unnoticed by the rest of the population. In this sit-
uation individuals may have the temptation to cheat by
defecting regardless of their action rules. The appearance
of this kind of mutation introduces a new set of strate-
gies, parameterized by the cheating probability pch, which
might render unstable strategies that would otherwise re-
sist invasions. The stability will of course be a function
of the probability that the action is witnessed, pdis.
To address this issue let us consider that residents de-
cide to cheat with a probability pch,1 and mutants do
so with a probability pch,2, in the hope that they are
not discovered. However their cheating will actually be
discovered with a probability pdis. Assuming the same
moral assessments and action rules for all individuals,
xG∗1 = x
∗G
1 = x
ch
1H and x
G∗
2 = x
∗G
2 = x
ch
2 , where the frac-
tions xch1H and x
ch
2 are calculated as above from Eqs. (4)
and (A3), but incorporating the probability of being dis-
covered if they cheat. Likewise Pi,αβ in Eq. (2) has to be
replaced by
P chi,αβ = (1 − pdispch,i)Pi,αβ + pdispch,imiαβ(D), (14)
which expresses the fact that nothing changes if player i
either does not cheat or she does without being discov-
ered [probability 1− pch,i+ pch,i(1− pdis) = 1− pdispch,i];
otherwise [probability pdispch,i] she is judged good or bad
according to miαβ(D).
Finally, the probabilities of cooperation [c.f. Eq. (11)]
6mGG(C) mGG(D) mGB(C) mGB(D) mBG(C) mBG(D) mBB(C) mBB(D) aGG aGB aBG aBB W˜H
Ia G B G G G B G B C D C C 0.9902
Ib G B B G G B G B C D C C 0.9902
IIa G B G G G B G G C D C D 0.9901
IIb G B G G G B B G C D C D 0.9901
IIc G B B G G B G G C D C D 0.9901
IId G B B G G B B G C D C D 0.9901
IIIa G B G G G B B B C D C D 0.9900
IIIb G B B G G B B B C D C D 0.9900
G B B B G B G B C D C C 0.9135
G B B B G B G G C D C D 0.9049
G B B B G B B G C D C D 0.9049
G B B G B B G B C D D C 0.8340
G B G G B B G B C D D C 0.8340
G B B G B B B G C D D D 0.8264
G B B G B B G G C D D D 0.8264
G B G G B B B G C D D D 0.8264
G B G G B B G G C D D D 0.8264
B B B G G B B B D D C D 0.2500
B B G G G B B B D D C D 0.2500
TABLE I. Coherent stable strategies and their normalized average payoffs W˜H for the case b/c = 2 and ǫA = 0.01. The top
eight strategies (labeled Ia through to IIIb) are the so-called Leading Eight [16]. They are the ones with the highest payoffs
among all the stable strategies obtained for a given benefit-to-cost ratio (b/c).
are modified as
θch1,1 = (1 − pch,1)(1− ǫA)
∑
αβ
χα(x
ch
1H)χβ(x
ch
1H) a1αβ ,
θch1,2 = (1 − pch,1)(1− ǫA)
∑
αβ
χα(x
ch
1H)χβ(x
ch
2 ) a1αβ ,
θch2,1 = (1 − pch,2)(1− ǫA)
∑
αβ
χα(x
ch
2 )χβ(x
ch
1H) a2αβ ,
θch2,2 = (1 − pch,2)(1− ǫA)
∑
αβ
χα(x
ch
2 )χβ(x
ch
2 ) a2αβ .
(15)
We have studied the stability of the leading eight
strategies against the invasion of cheaters. We divided
the leading eight strategies in Groups I, II and III as a
function of its different behavior (as it was done in [16]).
Figure 2 represents the limiting p∗dis below (above) which
mutants who cheat with a higher (lower) probability than
residents can invade. In Appendix B we calculate analyti-
cally the shape of this curve in the limit ǫA → 0. Figure 2
shows that below the curve p∗dis(pch) cheating increases
without bound through subsequents invasions until the
whole population is dominated by defectors. In other
words, if cheating occurs and the probability of being
discovered is not high enough, none of the leading eight
strategies survives. In particular, if pdis < c/b full defec-
tion is the unavoidable fate of the population. Thus, if
only small mutations are allowed in a honest population,
we find the Hamilton-like rule bpdis > c for the survival
of cooperation [28].
Increasing ǫA makes it even easier for cheaters to in-
vade, with the exception of the strategies belonging to
Group III, which seem to be insensitive to the effect of
errors in action.
V. DISCUSSION
We have carried out a systematic study of the stabil-
ity of all possible third-order indirect reciprocity strate-
gies. We extended the work of Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16]
confronting all the strategies against the others regard-
less of whether they have the same moral assessments
or not. The main difference with their model is that in
ours individuals directly witness all actions. Allowing in-
dividuals in the same population to have different moral
assessments and action rules makes indirect observation
models computationally unfeasible (we must store every-
body’s opinion of everybody else at every time step). For
the same reason, errors in judgments cannot be accounted
for in direct observation models. Thus we only consider
errors in performing the actions. The only exception to
this assumption is the need to introduce errors in judge-
ment to calculate, in some special cases, the stationary
fractions of good and bad individuals in homogeneous
populations. But this is just a technical issue that allows
us to resolve a degeneracy of solutions, and there is no
inconsistency because the results do not depend on the
value of this error.
The strategies which are stable against invasions by
other strategies sharing the same moral assessment turn
out to be also stable against invasions by any other strat-
egy. This means that if a strategy can resist the invasion
of all the other strategies that share its same moral as-
sessment, it can resits any invasion whatsoever.
We have checked that the higher the benefit-to-cost ra-
tio and the lower the action errors the higher the number
of stable strategies obtained. One possible interpretation
of the errors in action is lack of resources. Under this
interpretation our results show that scarcity of resources
favors invasions. On the other hand, we have checked
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Limit curves of p∗dis as a function of pch that divide the regions where the cheating can be increased
(above the curves) and decreased (below the curves) through the invasion of mutants with different pch. Different types of lines
represent different values of ǫA: 0.1 (continuous), 0.01 (dashed) and 0.001 (doted). Different panels show results for different
groups of leading eight strategies and b/c.
that populations whose members receive more benefit for
a given cost are more resistant to invasions.
As pointed out in Ref. [16], there is a symmetry be-
tween the moral assessments of the strategies. Good and
bad are just labels with no proper meaning—in contrast
to actions, that have a direct influence in the payoffs. In
order to break that symmetry and provide a meaning to
those labels we have introduced the concept of coherence.
Coherence links moral assessments with action rules. We
have shown that stable strategies appear in pairs due to
the above mentioned symmetry, but coherence values are
complementary. This allows us to choose only one of the
strategies (the most coherent) within each pair for later
analysis and interpretation.
The stable strategies we obtain include the Leading
Eight found by Ohtsuki and Iwasa [16]. These are also the
most efficient ones (those with highest payoffs). Both the
Leading Eight as well as the remaining stable strategies
that we have obtained share some features, and except
for the two least efficient strategies (with W˜H = 0.25),
all of them obtain high average payoffs (W˜H > 0.8).
They identify defectors (mGG(D) = mBG(D) = B) and,
except the two least efficient strategies, maintain coop-
eration (aGG = C and mGG(C) = G). All of them
punish defectors (aGB = D), although three of the sta-
ble strategies (with W˜H ∼ 0.9) do not judge this as a
good behavior. Finally the most efficient stable strate-
gies (W˜H > 0.9) forgive bad individuals who help good
players (mBG(C) = G and aBG = C). The more of these
features the strategies follow the higher their payoff. For
instance, the three strategies with W˜H ∼ 0.9 turn good
punishers into bad individuals and they can only restore
their reputation by helping good individuals. And in the
case of strategies with W˜H < 0.9, bad individuals cannot
increase their reputation by helping good players, but
only by interacting with other bad individuals.
We have also found that all these strategies may be-
come unstable if cheaters arise. If the probability of wit-
nessing a cheat is not high enough, cheaters can take over
an honest population. Upon increasing the cheating prob-
ability pdis > c/b the population eventually turns into
pure defectors. Interestingly, the condition for a popula-
tion to resist this effect is of the Hamilton type, namely,
bpdis > c, where b is the benefit and c the cost. Errors in
action make this condition even more restrictive for the
stability of a honest population.
8Cheating is always a danger for cooperation based on
indirect reciprocity. Even in societies where this mech-
anism is of utmost importance cheating always threats
honest behavior. For instance, the (now extinct) Patag-
onian tribes of the Ya´mana are among the reported so-
cieties more strongly based on indirect reciprocity [29].
Sharing food even with nonrelatives appeared to be the
default behavior. Not sticking to it brought a bad rep-
utation and severe social pubishment (e.g., not partici-
pating in further food sharing). Yet, cheating among the
Ya´mana was reported to occur when chances were low
to be discovered (for instance, because the prey obtained
was easy to hide; see Ref. [29], p. 197).
One of the problems that emerges from considering dif-
ferent moral assessments is the possibility that the frac-
tions of good and bad individuals may depend on the
initial setup. We sort out this issue by choosing realistic
initial conditions for the differential equations describing
the evolution of these fractions. Essentially, we assume
that mutations do not change the previous judgments
that individuals had on each other. This notwithstand-
ing, we have analyzed other initial conditions in which
not all individuals have the same opinion. A typical setup
where this might happen is when a rumor is spread over
a fraction of the population. We have checked that, al-
though misjudgement can survive or even spread over a
larger fraction of the population, it eventually disappears
because mutants with a wrong judgement get less payoff
than residents who use one of the stable strategies.
Admittedly, in order to carry out such a systematic
analysis as we have performed here, we have had to sac-
rifice some realism in the model. On the one hand,
we have considered that reputation can only have two
states: good and bad. This binary reputation have been
used in several preceding studies [16, 23] and implies that
only the actions that happen in the last round are taken
into account to assign reputation. However, Tanabe et
al. [30] have studied a model with trinary reputations
and showed that some strategies (like the so-called image
scoring) can be stable in a trinary-reputation model but
not in a binary-reputation one. On the other hand, we
have considered that every player has complete informa-
tion of every single interaction in the population (except
when we introduced cheating). This is too strong an as-
sumption and some studies discuss the effect of a lim-
ited access to the information (see [31] and the references
therein).
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Appendix A
The two sets of Eqs. (8) and (9) can be simplified in
the steady state dx/dt = 0. Thus, summing over the
reputation Λ2 in Eqs. (8) we obtain
xG∗1 =
∑
Λ2
xGΛ21 = x1H . (A1)
Therefore we can reduce Eqs. (8) to just two equations
in two unknowns (e.g., xGG1 and x
BB
1 ) by setting
xGB1 = x
G∗
1 − x
GG
1 ,
xBG1 = 1− x
G∗
1 − x
BB
1 .
(A2)
The two remaining equations from (8) have to be solved
numerically using the initial conditions discussed in
Sec. III B.
On the other hand, the set of Eqs. (9) is decoupled
from the set (8), and so they can be solved analytically
after solving the latter. This is easier if x∗G2 is calculated
first,
x∗G2 =
[
x∗G1 P2,01 + (1− x
∗G
1 )P2,00
]
×
[
1 + x∗G1 (P2,01 − P2,11)
+(1− x∗G1 )(P2,00 − P2,10)
]
−1
.
(A3)
Hence Eq. (9) reduces to a linear system of two equations
in the two unknowns xGG2 , x
BB
2 .
There are scenarios where the solution of xΛ1Λ22 turns
out to be degenerated. In these situations the set of
Eqs. (9) need to be integrated along with the set of
Eqs. (8).
Appendix B
Consider a resident population whose individuals play
one of the leading eight strategies with probability 1 −
pch,1 but defect otherwise. Consider mutants who do the
same, but with a probability 1− pch,2. For simplicity let
us assume the limiting case ǫA → 0. Applying adaptive
dynamics [32], the curve separating the regions where the
mutant can or cannot invade the population is given by
dW (pch,2, pch,1)
dpch,2
∣∣∣∣
pch,2=pch,1
= 0, (B1)
where the payoff W (pch,2, pch,1) is equivalent to W (2|1).
According to Eq. (12),
dW (pch,2, pch,1)
dpch,2
= b
dθch1,2
dpch,2
− c
dθch2,1
dpch,2
. (B2)
To go further we need to separate the strategies of the
three groups.
1. Group I strategies
Using Eqs. (15) for the leading eight strategies, the
probabilities of cooperation θchi,j are
θch1,2 =(1− pch,1)
[
xch2 + (1− x
ch
1,H)(1 − x
ch
2 )
]
,
θch2,1 =(1− pch,2)
[
xch1,H + (1− x
ch
1,H)(1 − x
ch
2 )
]
.
(B3)
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dθch1,2
dpch,2
=(1− pch,1)x
ch
1,H
dxch2
dpch,2
,
dθch2,1
dpch,2
=(1− xch1,H)
[
xch2 − (1− pch,2)
dxch2
dpch,2
]
− 1.
(B4)
The fractions xch1,H and x
ch
2 are obtained from Eqs. (4)
and (A3). To that purpose we need to substitute
P chi,11 = P
ch
i,01 = 1− pdispch,i, P
ch
i,10 = 1 (B5)
and
P chi,00 = 1− pdispch,i. (B6)
Thus xch1,H is the solution of
pdispch,1(x
ch
1,H)
2 = (1− pdispch,1)(1 − x
ch
1,H), (B7)
and once it is obtained,
xch2 =
1− pdispch,2
1− (1− xch1,H)pdispch,2
,
dxch2
dpch,2
= −
pdisx
ch
1,H
[1− (1− xch1,H)pdispch,2]
2
.
(B8)
Substituting into (B4) and setting pch,2 = pch,1 ≡ pch
yields
dθch1,2
dpch
=−
(1− pch,1)pdis(x
ch
1,H)
2
[1− pdispch(1− xch1,H)]
2
,
dθch2,1
dpch,2
=
xch1,H [pdis(1− x
ch
1,H)− 1]
[1− pdispch(1 − xch1,H)]
2
.
(B9)
Therefore p∗dis is the solution of the system
p∗dis[b(1− pch)x
∗ + c(1− x∗)] = c,
p∗dispch(x
∗)2 = (1 − p∗dispch)(1− x
∗).
(B10)
2. Group II strategies
For the strategies of this group
θch1,2 = (1− pch,1)x
ch
2 , θ
ch
2,1 = (1 − pch,2)x
ch
1,H , (B11)
hence their derivatives are
dθch1,2
dpch,2
= (1− pch,1)
dxch2
dpch,2
,
dθch2,1
dpch,2
= −xch1 . (B12)
Probabilities P chi,αβ are now given by (B5) as well as
P chi,00 = 1. Thus, after Eqs. (4) and (A3),
xch1,H =
1
1 + pdispch,1
, xch2 = 1−x
ch
1,Hpdispch,2. (B13)
Substituting into (B12) and setting pch,2 = pch,1 ≡ pch
yields
dθch1,2
dpch,2
= −
(1 − pch)pdis
1 + pdispch
,
dθch2,1
dpch,2
= −
1
1 + pdispch
,
(B14)
and therefore
p∗dis =
c
b (1− pch)
. (B15)
3. Group III strategies
For the strategies of this group the probabilities of
cooperation and their derivatives are also given by
Eqs. (B11) and (B12), and the probabilities P chi,αβ by (B5)
as well as P chi,00 = 0. Thus, after Eqs. (4) and (A3),
xch1,H = 1− pdispch,1, x
ch
2 = 1− pdispch,2. (B16)
Substituting into (B12) and setting pch,2 = pch,1 ≡ pch
yields
dθch1,2
dpch,2
=− (1 − pch)pdis,
dθch2,1
dpch,2
=− (1 − pdispch),
(B17)
and therefore
p∗dis =
c
c pch + b (1− pch)
. (B18)
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